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In temporal discounting, individuals often prefer smaller immediate rewards to larger delayed rewards,
implying a trade off between the magnitude and delay of future rewards. While recent functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of temporal discounting have generated conﬂicting ﬁndings, no
studies have focused on whether distinct neural substrates respond to the magnitude and delay of future
rewards. Combining a novel, temporally distributed discounting task with event-related fMRI, we found that
while nucleus accumbens (NAcc), mesial prefrontal cortical (MPFC), and posterior cingulate cortical (PCC)
activation positively correlated with future reward magnitude, dorsolateral prefrontal cortical (DLPFC) and
posterior parietal cortical (PPC) activation negatively correlated with future reward delay. Further, more
impulsive individuals showed diminished NAcc activation to the magnitude of future rewards and greater
deactivations to delays of future rewards in the MPFC, DLPFC, and PPC. These ﬁndings suggest that while
mesolimbic dopamine projection regions show greater sensitivity to the magnitude of future rewards, lateral
cortical regions show greater (negative) sensitivity to the delay of future rewards, potentially reconciling
different neural accounts of temporal discounting.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Whether foraging for food or saving for retirement, organisms
must often decide between immediate and future payoffs. Behavioral
research indicates that beyond preferring larger rewards to smaller
rewards, individuals also prefer immediate rewards to future rewards.
As the delay until reward delivery increases, an individual's valuation
of a future reward declines (Mazur, 1987), a phenomenon known as
temporal discounting (Ainslie, 1975; Samuelson, 1937). Temporal
discounting thus implies the potential for conﬂict, since individuals
must sometimes trade off preferences for larger magnitudes against
preferences for shorter delays. Individuals vary widely in the rate at
which they discount future rewards, and these variations correlate
with real-world behavior ranging from impatience to scholastic
performance to substance abuse (Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Kirby et
al., 2005; Reynolds, 2006). However, the neural processes underlying
temporal discounting remain unclear.
Recent fMRI research has approached the neural correlates of
temporal discounting from the perspective of different behavioral
models, generating two distinct accounts. In an initial fMRI study,
McClure et al. (2004) found that activation in mesolimbic dopamine
projection regions (i.e., nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC)) correlated with choices involving immedi-
ate rewards, while activation in lateral cortical regions (i.e., dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC))
correlated with choices involving all rewards, immediate or future
(McClure et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007). They interpreted these
ﬁndings to support a two-component model of temporal discounting
in which one system weights immediate rewards (called the “beta
system”) while another weights rewards at all delays (called the “delta
system”;( Laibson, 1997)). In contrast to these initial ﬁndings, Kable
and Glimcher (2007) found that activation in mesolimbic projection
regions (including NAcc and MPFC) correlated with a combination of
the magnitude and delay of future rewards. They interpreted these
ﬁndings to support a one-component model of temporal discounting
in which a single system responds to a combination of magnitude and
delay information, discounting future rewards hyperbolically (Ainslie,
1975). While these studies have generated conﬂicting accounts of the
neural basis of temporal discounting, neither focused on whether
neural responses to the magnitude and delay of future rewards could
be distinguished prior to choice.
One alternative to correlating brain activity with different
behavioral models of temporal discounting is to examine the neural
responses to independent decision components—in this case, the
magnitude and delay of future rewards. Several fMRI studies have
focused solely on the neural correlates of anticipated reward
magnitude, spanning diverse reward modalities including monetarily,
gustatorily, and socially rewarding stimuli. Together, these studies
indicate that activation in mesolimbic projection regions, and the
NAcc in particular, increase proportional to anticipated reward
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2003b). Less fMRI research, however, has speciﬁcally focused on
neural correlates of future reward delay.
Several brain regions may play a role in representing delays of
future rewards. According to one account, delays of future rewards
directly diminish the neural representation of future reward magni-
tude, and thus should decrease activation in regions implicated in
reward processing including mesolimbic dopamine projection areas
(e.g., NAcc and MPFC; (Kable and Glimcher, 2007)). According to
another account, delays of future rewards evoke uncertaintyabout the
timeand likelihoodof rewarddelivery (Read andRead,2004) and thus
might elicit increased activation in deep cortical regions implicated
processing in uncertainty such as the anterior insula (Paulus, 2003;
Preuschoff et al., 2008) and anterior cingulate cortices (Critchley et al.,
2001). According to a third account, representation of future reward
delay requires cognitive control (e.g., imaginingone's self in the future
or inhibiting automatic responses for immediate outcomes), and thus
longer delays should elicit activation in cortical regions involved in
cognitive control including the DLPFC, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Ainslie, 2001; McClure et al., 2004,
2007). Currently, however, no fMRI studies have directly demon-
strated brain activation that correlates with future reward delay
independent of magnitude.
The aim of this study was to examine whether dissociable neural
substrates would respond to the magnitude and delay of a future
reward, using an adaptation of traditional temporal discounting tasks
(Kirby and Maraković, 1995; Richards et al., 1999). To independently
examine the neural responses to the magnitude and delay of future
rewards, we used an orthogonalized, parametric task with event-
related fMRI. While we predicted that activation in mesolimbic
projection regions (NAcc and MPFC) would correlate with the
magnitude of future rewards, we also examined whether activation in
other regions (i.e., either NAcc and MPFC, anterior insula and cingulate
cortex, or lateral cortical regions) would correlate with the delay of
future rewards. Finally, we explored whether individual differences in
the sensitivity of these regions to future reward magnitude and delay
correlated with individuals' temporal discounting rates.
Methods
Participants
Sixteen healthy right-handed native English-speaking adults (8
females; mean age 21.6 (±2.13)) participated in the study. Participants
had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders and gave
informed consent for a protocol approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the Stanford University School of Medicine.
Temporal discounting task
Each task trial included four periods that separately presented
information related to reward magnitude, delay, and choice solicita-
tion (see Fig. 1). Because we aimed to distinguish activity related to
magnitude or delay information while maintaining consistency with
previous studies, information was revealed in the order a subject
would encounter in a typical discounting questionnaire (Kirby and
Maraković, 1995; Richards et al., 1999). The ﬁrst screen (2000 ms)
presented the immediate option, which always offered a reward
magnitude of $10.00 at a delay of 0 days. Presentation of this constant
immediate reward provided a comparison standard for subsequently
presented variable future rewards, and eliminated potential con-
founds due to individual differences in memory for the immediate
option. Next, the magnitude of the future option was presented (mag
period, 2000 ms), which varied over seven amounts ($10.00, $10.50,
$11.00, $13.00, $15.00, $20.00, $25.00). Next, the delay of the future
option was presented (del period, 2000 ms), which varied over six
durations (0, 7, 30, 60, 90, 180 days). A fully crossed factorial design
with orthogonal, parametric variation of magnitude and delay
variables ensured the potential for separate visualization of neural
responses to each variable, even in the case of temporal overlap
(Buckner, 1998). Finally, the last screen solicited subjects' choice for
either the immediate or future option with the appearance of left and
right arrows (choice period, 2000 ms), which randomly linked each
option to either the right or left button. Left and right spatial
counterbalancing of choice options limited lateralized motor prepara-
tion to the choice period. Subjects responded within 2000 ms, and
feedback indicated which of the options they had chosen (bychanging
color). Consistent timing of each phase (i.e., 2000 ms each for
immediate, mag, del, and choice periods) allowed reliable and
temporally targeted measurement of peak activation during each
phase, which was necessary for subsequent analyses involving
averaging by trial type and correlation with individual difference
measures of temporal discounting. Each trial ended with a 2–6s
variable inter-trial interval (ITI). Trial blocks included 42 pseudor-
andomized trial types such that every combination of magnitude and
delay was presented once within a block. Subjects played two blocks,
yielding a total of 84 trials during both initial behavioral and
subsequent fMRI sessions.
To verify that discounting measures were reliable within subjects,
individuals participated in an initial behavioral practice session during
which they played the task on a computer. Subjects were informed
Fig.1. Task design. The temporaldiscounting task staggered presentation of information
for future reward magnitude, future reward delay, and choice selection, providing an
opportunity to isolate brain activity related to each. The ﬁrst screen (2 s) presented the
immediate option, which always offered a reward magnitude of $10.00 at a delay of
0 days. Next, the reward magnitude of the future option was presented (2 s), which
varied between seven different amounts (ranging from $10.00 to $25.00). Next, the
delay of the future option was presented (2 s), which varied between 6 delays (ranging
from 0 to 180 days). The last screen solicited subjects' choice for either the immediate or
future option (2 s). Each trial ended with a 2–6 s variable inter-trial interval (ITI). Trial
blocks included 42 pseudorandomized trial types such that every combination of
magnitude and delay was presented once, and subjects played two blocks, yielding a
total of 84 trials.
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randomly drawn trial to ensure incentive-compatibility. During
scanning, subjects again played the task and again received payment
for one randomly drawn trial, in addition to a payment of $20.00 per
hour for undergoing scanning. If the outcome of the selected trial was
an immediate gain, subjects received $10.00 at the end of the session;
otherwise, payment was mailed to subjects at the speciﬁed delay.
Behavioral analysis
Individuals' choice behavior for behavioral and fMRI sessions was
analyzed with Matlab (MATLAB, Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA). Subjects'
indifference points were calculated at each delay to ﬁt individualized
discounting curves. This was accomplished by extracting subjects'
choices for a given delay, assigning binary values for choosing the
immediate (0) or future option (1), and then ﬁtting a logistic function
to determine the dollar amount at which there was a 0.5 probability of
choosing the immediate versus the future option (and hence, subjects
were “indifferent” to receiving either the immediate or the future
option). Indifference points were averaged between blocks, and
discounted value (DV) of the future option relative to the immediate
option ($10.00) was calculated for each delay (DV=$10.00/indiffer-
ence point).
To index individual differences in temporal discounting behavior,
several models of discounting were considered; however, quantitative
characterization of behavior rather than model comparison was the
primary goal of the study. Exponential, hyperbolic, and beta–delta
models of temporal discounting were ﬁt to each subject's discounting
behavior(seeSupplementaryFig.1).Thehyperbolicdiscountingmodel
ﬁt individuals' behavior equally well as other models, and since this
model has been widely adopted in both human and animal studies of
discounting (see Green and Myerson, 2004 for review) and offers the
most parsimonious summary of discounting behavior by ﬁtting a
single individualized parameter (k), we used the hyperbolic model to
explore individual differences. Discounted value (DV) was ﬁt to the
hyperbolic model of temporal discounting according to the equation:
DV=1= 1+kTD ðÞ
(Mazur,1987; Rodriguez and Logue,1988), where D is the lengthof the
delay in days and k is an individual discounting parameter. Larger
values of k indicated more impulsivity, while smaller values of k
indicated more patience.
FMRI acquisition and analysis
Images were acquired with a 1.5-T General Electric magnetic
resonance scanner using a standard birdcage quadrature head coil.
Twenty-four 4-mm-thick slices (in-plane resolution 3.75×3.75 mm,
no gap) extended axially from the mid-pons to the top of the skull,
providing whole-brain coverage and adequate spatial resolution of
subcortical regions of interest (e.g. midbrain, NAcc, orbitofrontal
cortex). Whole-brain functional scans were acquired with a T2⁎-
sensitive spiral-in/-out pulse sequence (TR=2 s, TE=40 ms, ﬂip=90°)
optimized to minimize signal dropout at the base of the brain (Glover
and Law, 2001). High-resolution structural scans were also acquired to
facilitate localization and coregistration of functional data using a T1-
weighted spoiled grass sequence (TR=100 ms, TE=7 ms, ﬂip=90°).
Analyses were conducted using Analysis of Functional Neural
Images (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). For preprocessing, voxel time
series were sinc-interpolated to correct for nonsimultaneous slice
acquisition, bandpass ﬁltered (admitting frequencies from 8 to 90 s),
and normalized to percent signal change with respect to the voxel
mean for the entire task. Visual inspection of motion correction
estimates conﬁrmed that no subject's head moved more than 2.0 mm
in any dimension from one volume acquisition to the next.
Analysesproceededthroughthreestages:whole-brainlocalization,
VOI time course veriﬁcation, and correlation with individual differ-
ences. Localization analyses employed a multiple regression model
using independent and parametric regressors representing future
reward magnitude (modeled during the magnitude period), future
rewarddelay(modeledduringthedelayperiod),andtheinteractionof
magnitude and delay (modeled during the delay period). The model
also included regressors of noninterest indexing residual motion (6),
baseline,linear,andquadratictrendsforeachofthetwoblocks(6),and
general period effects (i.e., immediate, magnitude, delay, and choice
periods, as well the entire trial period (5)).
Maps of contrast coefﬁcients for regressors of interest were
coregistered with structural maps, spatially normalized by manually
warping to Talairach space, spatially smoothed to minimize effects of
anatomic variability (FWHM=4 mm), and collectively submitted to a
one-sample t-test against the null hypothesis of no activation to test
fora group differencewhile controlling for random effects. Volumes of
interest (VOIs) were deﬁned in regions whose activation correlated
with magnitude, delay, or interaction regressors at a pb0.001
voxelwise threshold in group maps with a minimum cluster of 20
contiguous 2.0 mm cubic voxels (the minimum cluster criterion for a
pb0.05 whole-brain gray matter corrected threshold as speciﬁed by
AFNI's AlphaSim; (Cox, 1996)).
For activation time course veriﬁcation analyses, VOIs were
speciﬁed based on regional foci identiﬁed in the localization analyses
(i.e., right NAcc, MPFC, left DLPFC, PCC, posterior parietal cortex,
temporal parietal junction, and right inferior frontal gyrus). Spatially
averaged activation time courses were extracted from each VOI and
then divided by the average activation for each VOI over the course of
the entire experiment to derive measures of percent signal change. To
separately examine the inﬂuence of magnitude and delay information
on activation in these regions, VOI time courses were extracted and
binned into nine conditions according to a 3×3 factorial design: low
($10.00, $10.50), medium ($11.00, $13.00, $15.00), and high ($20.00,
$25.00) magnitude×low (0, 7 days), medium (30, 60 days), and high
delays (90, 180 days). Since subjects' choice behavior was approxi-
mately linearly related to increasing parametric levels of magnitude
and delay (see Supplementary Fig. 2), grouping of magnitude and
delay into high, medium, and low levels simpliﬁed subsequent
factorial analyses. VOI peak activation during magnitude and delay
periods (lagged by 6 s to account for the hemodynamic response) was
submitted to 2-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with magnitude and
delay as the within-subjects factors and subjects as random effects.
VOI peak activation from regions showing signiﬁcant main effects
of magnitude or delay, or their interaction was then submitted to
post-hoc pair-wise t-tests to verify signiﬁcant differences between
low, medium and high levels of magnitude and delay.
For individual difference analyses, parameter estimates (in the
form of beta coefﬁcients) for the parametric magnitude and delay
whole-brain regressors were extracted fromindividuals' regional VOIs
identiﬁed in the group localization analyses. These coefﬁcients
indexed an individuals' neural sensitivity to magnitude or delay
information. Averaged coefﬁcients for each VOI were then correlated
with individuals' tendency to discount the future option (as indexed
by individuals' hyperbolic discounting rate, or k, normalized by a
square root transform).
Results
Behavior
All subjects selected both immediate and future reward options
during the task (i.e., no subject unconditionallychose all immediate or
all future options), but individuals varied widely in their preferences
forimmediateversus futurerewards.The percentage ofchoicesforthe
immediate $10.00 option ranged from 24% to 81% of the trials. As
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models of discounting, in the present study we utilized k (the
individual discounting parameter for the hyperbolic model) to index
individual differences in temporal discounting.
Individuals' rates of temporal discounting (k) ranged from 0.0008
to 0.0814 (average 0.0207), similar to individual differences reported
in other studies (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kirby and Maraković,
1995). Discounting rates were reliable within subjects between
behavioral and fMRI sessions (test–retest r=0.869, pb0.001),
suggestive of trait-like stability (Supplementary Fig. 3). Discounting
rates did not differ according to gender (t=−0.563, df=14, p=0.583).
Reaction time signiﬁcantly decreased from the behavioral to the
fMRI session (t=−4.092, df=15, sd=95.05; pb0.001), but did not
signiﬁcantly differ for choice of the immediate versus the future
option (t=−0.006, df=15, sd=49.847; p=0.995), and did not
signiﬁcantly correlate with discounting rates, k (r
2=0.179) (Supple-
mentary Fig. 4).
Brain activation
Localization
Whole-brain localization analyses revealed that predicted regions
differed in sensitivity to magnitude versus delay information.
Increasing future reward magnitudes positively correlated with
activation in the right NAcc, MPFC, and posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC). Increasing future reward delay, however, negatively correlated
with activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), right
posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and left temporal–parietal junction
(TPJ). The interaction of magnitude and delay negatively correlated
withactivationin the rightinferiorfrontal gyrus(IFG)(See Table1, and
Fig. 2).
VOI time courses
Time courses of activation were extracted from each VOI to verify
the timing of neural responses to magnitude or delay indicated by the
statistical maps. As expected, activation in VOIs correlating with
magnitude in group maps (NAcc, MPFC, PCC) signiﬁcantly diverged
according to the magnitude of the future reward speciﬁcally during
the presentation of magnitude information, but did not diverge
according to delay (Fig. 3). Similarly, activation in VOIs correlating
with delay in group maps (DLPFC, TPJ, PPC) signiﬁcantly diverged
according to the delay of the future reward speciﬁcally during
presentation of delay information, but did not diverge according to
magnitude.
Two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant
double dissociation of magnitude and delay effects in these VOIs.
During presentation of magnitude information, activation in meso-
limbic projection regions including the NAcc (F=13.9, df=2,135 pb
0.001), MPFC (F=11.2, df=2,135pb0.001), and PCC (F=12.2, df=2,135
pb.001) showed signiﬁcant main effects of magnitude but not delay.
Activation in lateral cortical regions (DLPFC, TPJ, parietal cortex, IFG),
however, did not show signiﬁcant magnitude effects. Post-hoc t-tests
conﬁrmed signiﬁcant differences (pb0.05) between low and medium
and low and high magnitudes in the NAcc and PCC, and between all
three levels of magnitude in the MPFC. These ﬁndings suggest that
mesolimbic projection regions (as well as PCC) but not lateral cortical
regions were sensitive to the magnitude of the future option.
During presentation of delay information, activation in lateral
cortical regions including the DLPFC (F=7.9, df=2,135 p=0.001), TPJ
(F=6.3, df=2, 135 p=0.002), and posterior parietal cortex (F=5.9,
df=2,135p=0.003) showed main effects of delay but not magnitude.
Activation in mesolimbic projection regions, however, did not
show signiﬁcant delay effects (Fig. 3). Post-hoc t-tests conﬁrmed
signiﬁcant differences between low and high delays and medium
and high delays in the DLPFC, signiﬁcant differences between low
and high delays in the left TPJ, and between low and high delays
and low and medium delays in the right posterior parietal cortex.
Table 1
Activation foci for magnitude, delay and the magnitude×delay interaction
Region Volume Max Z score RAS
Magnitude
R NAcc 232 4.228 9 5 −4
L MPFC 416 3.950 −11 41 −8
PCC 160 3.785 −1 −51 14
Delay
L DLPFC 232 −4.264 −19 55 8
LT P J 1 6 8 −4.013 −47 −57 26
R posterior parietal 216 −4.433 31 −73 30
Magnitude×delay interaction
R IFG 168 −4.298 55 −12 0
All regions surpassed threshold of 20 contiguous 2.0 mm
3 voxels at pb0.001,
uncorrected; pb0.05, corrected.
Fig. 2. Brain activation correlating with magnitude or delay. (a) Brain regions signiﬁcantly correlating with the magnitude of the future option (right NAcc, MPFC, PCC). (b) Brain
regions signiﬁcantly correlating with the delay of the future option (left DLPFC, left TPJ, right posterior parietal cortex). (c) Brain regions signiﬁcantly correlating with the interaction
of magnitude and delay (right IFG). For all images warm colors indicate positive correlations, cool colors indicate negative correlations; pb0.001, uncorrected; pb0.05 corrected.
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mesolimbic projection regions were sensitive to the delay of the
future option. Finally, activation in the right IFG showed a signiﬁcant
magnitude×delay interaction when submitted to ANOVA (F=3.25,
df=4, 135p=0.014).
Individual difference analyses
While localization and VOI analyses tested for group effects and
controlled for individual differences, individual difference analyses
probed variations between subjects. Speciﬁcally, we examined
whether individuals' neural responsiveness to magnitude and delay
information correlated with their rates of temporal discounting.
Individual differences in neural sensitivity to future reward
magnitude negatively correlated with subjects' temporal discounting
rates. Speciﬁcally, magnitude-relatedactivation in the NAcc negatively
correlated with discounting rates (r=−0.509, p=0.044), such that
more impulsive subjects showed less neural activation to future
rewards with large magnitudes (Fig. 4a). The NAcc was the only VOI to
show magnitude sensitivity that signiﬁcantly correlated with indivi-
duals' discount rates (see Supplementary Table 1 for all VOI
correlation coefﬁcients).
Additionally, subjects' temporal discounting rates correlated
with individual differences in (negative) neural sensitivity to future
reward delay. Speciﬁcally, delay-related deactivation in the DLPFC
and posterior parietal cortex correlated with temporal discounting
rates (DLPFC r=−0.520, p=0.039; PPC r=−0.528, p=0.036), such
that more impulsive subjects showed greater deactivations to
future rewards with long delays (Fig. 4b). Notably, delay-related
activation in the magnitude-sensitive regions of the MPFC and PCC
also negatively correlated with temporal discounting rates (MPFC
r=−0.624, p=0.010; PCC r=−0.728, p=0.001), even though these
regions did not show group-wide main effects of delay (Fig. 4c).
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that more impulsive subjects show
less neural sensitivity to the larger magnitudes of future rewards
but greater (negative) neural sensitivity to the longer delays of
future rewards.
Discussion
Usingevent-related fMRI and a novelparametric task, we observed
distinct neural responses to the magnitude and delay of future
rewards. Across subjects, activation in mesolimbic projection regions
(including the NAcc, MPFC, and PCC) correlated with increasing
magnitudes of future rewards, while activation in lateral cortical
regions (including the DLPFC, TPJ, and posterior parietal cortex)
negatively correlated with increasing delays of future rewards.
Between subjects, more impulsive individuals showed diminished
neural activation tothe magnitude of future rewards as well as greater
deactivations to the delay of future rewards.
These ﬁndings indicate that activity in the NAcc, MPFC, and PCC
increases with larger magnitudes of a future reward, and so align with
a substantial body of research implicating mesolimbic circuits in
representing the magnitude of anticipated rewards (Knutson et al.,
2001; Knutson and Cooper, 2005). Further, in the present study, NAcc
activation responded speciﬁcally to future reward magnitude but not
delay in both groupwise and individual difference analyses. These
ﬁndingsalso provide initial evidenceof dissociable delay-related brain
activation, since activity in lateral cortical regions (i.e., DLPFC, TPJ, and
posterior parietal cortex) decreased in response to longer delays of
Fig. 3. Time courses of activation from representative magnitude-sensitive (right NAcc)
and delay-sensitive (DLPFC) regions (columns). Row 1 shows time courses of % signal
change binned by high, medium, and low magnitudes, where magnitude-sensitive
regions like the NAcc clearly respond to different levels of magnitude during the
magnitude period, while delay-sensitive regions like the DLPFC do not. Row 2 shows
time courses of % signal change binned by high, medium, and low delays, where delay-
sensitive regions like the DLPFC clearly respond to different levels of delay during the
delay period, while magnitude-sensitive regions like the NAcc do not. Time courses
from all VOIs are reported in supplementary materials (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Fig. 4. Individual differences in neural sensitivity to future reward magnitudes and delays predict individuals' temporal discounting rates. (a) Neural response to magnitudes in the
magnitude-sensitive NAcc negatively correlates with discounting rates (k, normalized by square-root transform). More “impulsive” individuals show less NAcc activation to large
magnitudes of future rewards. (b) Neural response to delays in delay-sensitive regions (DLPFC, posterior parietal cortex) correlates with discounting rates (k, normalized by square-
root transform). More “impulsive” individuals show more DLPFC and PPC deactivations to long delays of future rewards. (c) Neural response to delays in magnitude-sensitive regions
(MPFC, PCC) also correlates with discounting rates (k, normalized by square-root transform). More “impulsive” individuals show MPFC and PCC deactivations to long delays, while
more “patient” subjects do not show MPFC or PCC deactivations with delays.
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individuals showed greater deactivations in these regions in response
to longer delays. These ﬁndings are consistent with other fMRI
evidence that decreased activation in lateral cortical regions correlates
with choosing an immediate reward overa future reward (Boettiger et
al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004, 2007), which is likelyto occur whenthe
delay of the future reward is unattractively long. Together, these
results demonstrate for the ﬁrst time a double dissociation of regions
responsive to the magnitude (i.e., NAcc) versus delay (i.e., DLPFC) of
future rewards in the context of temporal discounting.
The present ﬁndings further suggest that some regions (i.e., the
MPFC and PCC) might respond to both the magnitude and delay of
future rewards. Although these regions only demonstrated signiﬁcant
group effects of magnitude, in the most impulsive individuals, they
also showed decreased activation in response to future rewards with
long delays. Given the role of the MPFC in integrating different kinds
of value information (e.g., preference, likelihood, cost; (Knutson et al.,
2003, 2005, 2007; O'Doherty et al., 2003a; Plassmann et al., 2007),
these regions may integrateperceivedbeneﬁts andcosts to potentially
inform upcoming choice.
Finally, activation in a cortical region in the right IFG correlated
with an interaction of future rewardmagnitude and delay. Speciﬁcally,
IFG activation correlated negatively with longer delays, but only
during trials offering high magnitudes of future rewards. While this
ﬁnding was not initially predicted, it aligns well with previous fMRI
research implicating the IFG in response inhibition and cognitive
control of pre-potent responses (Aron et al., 2004b; Garavan et al.,
2002; Menon et al., 2001). In the present task, IFG may be recruited
when subjects must withhold fast, automatic responses, particularly
when the stakes are high, in order to thoroughly evaluate the reward
alternatives. However, further research is required to speciﬁcally test
this hypothesis.
Implications for different neural accounts of temporal discounting
The present ﬁndings share both consistencies and inconsistencies
with two distinct accounts of temporal discounting in the fMRI
literature. A “two-system” account posits that mesolimbic dopamine
projection regions evaluate immediate rewards while dorsolateral
corticalregions evaluateall rewards (immediate orfuture) (McClureet
al., 2004, 2007). Consistent with this account, our ﬁndings revealed a
functional dissociation between a mesolimbic region (i.e., the NAcc)
and a dorsal cortical region (i.e., the DLPFC). Inconsistent with this
account, however, activation in both regions responded to different
attributes of the future reward after controlling for response to the
(constant) immediate reward, indicating that mesolimbic regions
respond to attributes of delayed as well as immediate rewards.
An alternative “one system” account posits that mesolimbic
projection regions (and PCC) respond to the combined magnitude
and delay of all potential rewards, whether immediate or delayed
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Consistent with this account, the current
ﬁndings revealed that some mesolimbic regions (i.e., MPFC, PCC)
responded to both the magnitude and delay of future rewards (but
only in the most impulsive subjects). Inconsistent with this account,
however, the functional dissociation revealed specialization within
mesolimbic regions, such that the NAcc primarily responded to future
rewardmagnitude,whilelateralcorticalregions(e.g.,DLPFC)primarily
responded to future reward delay. Thus, by independently manipulat-
ing both attributes of the future option, the present design yielded
ﬁndingsthatmightreconciledifferentaccountsbyindicatingthatboth
mesolimbic and lateral cortical regions respond to future rewards, but
differentially according to magnitude versus delay attributes.
A body of human and monkey research now demonstrates that
NAcc activation increases proportional to the magnitude of antici-
pated rewards (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003; Knutson et al., 2001;
Knutson and Greer, 2008). The current ﬁndings, however, provide the
ﬁrst evidence that independent activation in lateral cortical regions
decreases proportional to the delay until a future reward can be
obtained. These ﬁndings inform at least three accounts of which
neural substrates might represent the delay of future rewards.
According to one account (similar to the one-system account), the
delay of a future reward might reduce activation in regions whose
activation correlates with reward magnitude (e.g., mesolimbic
regions; (Kable and Glimcher, 2007)). Although there was some
evidence that long delays could decrease activation in the MPFC and
posterior cingulate of impulsive subjects, the main effect of delay in
these regions was not signiﬁcant across the entire group, and NAcc
activation did not signiﬁcantly change in response to delay informa-
tion. A second account might posit that long delays elicit uncertainty
(and/or fear of loss) and so should elicit activation in regions
implicated in uncertainty (e.g., the anterior cingulate and insula;
(Critchley et al., 2001; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Paulus, 2003;
Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008)). Activation in these regions, however,
did not increase proportional to the delay of the future reward. A third
account (similar to the two system account) proposes that choosing to
forego immediate gratiﬁcation and wait for a larger future reward
requires cognitive control and inhibition of prepotent responses,
which recruits lateral cortical regions like the DLPFC, IFG, and
posterior parietal cortex (Ainslie, 2001; Aron et al., 2003; Braver et
al., 1997; McClure et al., 2004). Furthermore, executive control might
represent a limited resource (as in the case of “willpower”;( Gailliot et
al., 2007)) and thus might be depleted by longer delays. These notions
are consistent with the present ﬁndings that activation in lateral
cortical regions decreases proportional to the delay of the future
reward, and does so more steeply for more impulsive individuals.
Thus, the executive control account is most consistent with the
ﬁndings of the present study with respect to neural correlates of
future reward delay.
The present ﬁndings also parallel ﬁndings from animal research.
Lesion studies of rats implicate both prefrontal and striatal regions in
temporal discounting (Cardinal, 2006; Cardinal et al., 2004). Recent
electrophysiologicalstudiesofmonkeysindicatethattheﬁringof DLPFC
neurons (Kim et al., 2008) as well as dopamine neurons themselves
(Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008) correlates with the magnitude and delay
of future rewards. While these ﬁndings suggest apparent similarities
with the present results, one cannot necessarily infer that increased
neural ﬁring translates to an increase in the signal measured by FMRI
(Logothetis and Wandell, 2004), and so mechanistic links will require
additionalmodelingandexperimentaltriangulationacrossspecies(e.g.,
Knutson and Gibbs, 2007).
Strengths, limitations, and implications for future research
The present study features a number of novel strengths. This study
is the ﬁrst to examine parametric variations in magnitude and delay
evaluation over the same choice option, occurring prior to choice.
Magnitude and delay information was independently varied and
staggered in time, facilitating disambiguation of neural responses to
each type of information. Motor demands were counterbalanced and
sequestered to the choice period, ruling out the potential inﬂuence of
motor preparation on the observed patterns of activation. This
temporally distributed design also allowed examination not only of
group effects but also of the relationship between individual
differences in neural responsiveness to magnitude and delay
information and subsequent choice.
The beneﬁts conferred by the present design also necessitated a
few tradeoffs. Neural responses to the immediate option could not be
examined separately (as in McClure et al., 2004), since the
immediate option was intentionally held constant across all trials.
This design sacriﬁce was necessary to allow parametric variation
of both magnitude and delay information over the same choice
option. Additionally, since the magnitude of the future option always
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consistent with the interpretation that NAcc, MPFC, and PPC
activation represent a reward prediction error (Knutson et al.,
2003; McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003c). One might
also expect these regions to show reward prediction error-related
activity in response to presented delay information; however, this
was not observed in group analyses. Such an account may still apply
to MPFC activation, since effects of delay were evident there, but only
in individual difference analyses.
Finally, to approximate the structure of behavioral delay discount-
ing tasks (Kirby and Maraković, 1995; Richards et al., 1999) while
limiting the already large number of conditions (i.e., a 6×7 factorial
design), magnitude information preceded delay information in each
trial. While the proximity of these events might raise the concern that
neural responses to the magnitude of the future option could carry
over and “pollute” neural responses to the delay of the future option,
the fully crossed factorial design and time course analyses suggested
that this was not the case. Speciﬁcally, group analyses revealed no
interaction of future reward magnitude and delay in any of the
volumes of interest. Further, time course analyses of the actual signal
demonstrated clearly dissociable effects of magnitude in NAcc and
delay in DLPFC (see Fig. 3). Reversing the order of presentation of
magnitude and delay information represents an interesting target for
further research, but would require an additional study, since it would
double the length of the present experimental design. Additionally,
investigators would need to ﬁrst establish that subjects show similar
behavior when this magnitude and delay information delivery is
reversed prior to scanning (Weber et al., 2007).
The ﬁnding that activation in dissociable regions correlates with
the magnitude versus delay of future rewards holds several implica-
tions for future research. Modulation of NAcc activity or dopamine
function (either transiently or permanently) might modify indivi-
duals' responsiveness to the magnitude of future rewards. On the
other hand, damage to lateral prefrontal regions (e.g., either due to
developmental inﬂuences, transient inactivation, or permanent
lesion) might impair peoples' ability to extend reward value into the
indeﬁnite future. Because fMRI research provides correlational
evidence, investigators will need to triangulate with ﬁndings
generated by other more causally informative methods (e.g., drugs,
stimulation, lesions) to support causal inferences (Aron et al., 2004a;
Cools et al., 2003; Fregni et al., 2008; Knoch and Fehr, 2007).
Conclusion
These ﬁndings provide initial human evidence for dissociable
neural representations of the magnitude and delay of future rewards
in the context of temporal discounting. The sensitivity of the nucleus
accumbens to magnitude information and of lateral cortical regions
to delay information also correlates with individual differences
in discounting behavior. These ﬁndings help to integrate currently
disparate neural accounts of temporal discounting, and generate
novel predictions about how neural development or damage might
inﬂuence individuals' ability to balance future reward magnitude
against delay.
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